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ABSTRACT
In this paper we describe the Royal Holloway key escrow scheme, which
provides a solution to the problem of managing cryptographic keys for end-
to-end encryption in a way that meets legal requirements for warranted
interception.
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1. Introduction
There has been much recent discussion on the question of how to meet users’ requirements for security
services, such as confidentiality and authentication, whilst at the same time meeting legitimate
requirements of government agencies for access to communications; a survey of recent work can be
found in an article by Denning and Branstad, [1].  The discussion has been largely prompted by the US
government’s Clipper proposals [2], as well as the increasing use of electronic means for transferring
commercially sensitive data.  On the one hand, users want the ability to communicate securely with
other users, wherever they may be, and on the other hand, governments have requirements to intercept
traffic in order to combat crime and protect national security.  Clearly, for any scheme to be acceptable
on a wide basis, it must provide the service that users want, as well as meeting legal requirements in the
territories it serves.
It seems likely that solutions to this ‘key escrow’ problem will be based on the use of trusted third
parties (TTPs) from which users can obtain keys for encrypting their data or providing other security
services.  Law enforcement agencies’ requirements will be met by obtaining relevant keys from a TTP
within their jurisdiction, so they can decrypt the communications that they are authorised to intercept.
We describe here a mechanism (the ‘Royal Holloway’ (RHUL) scheme) that will enable TTPs to
perform the dual rôle of providing users with key management services and providing law enforcement
agencies with warranted access to a particular user’s communications.  Unlike other proposals, the
mechanism allows users to update their keys according to their own internal security policies.  This
mechanism has previously been described in [3,4].
We go on to list typical application requirements for such a scheme, and consider how well the
proposed mechanism meets these requirements.  It is important to note that the scheme described here
has been designed to establish keys for providing end-to-end confidentiality services, and not for
integrity, origin authentication or non-repudiation services; the appropriateness of the mechanism for
providing these services is a matter for further study.
2. The Mechanism
The RHUL mechanism is based on Diffie-Hellman key exchange [5].  To simplify our description we
consider the mechanism in relation to one-way communication (such as e-mail).  Adapting the scheme
for two-way communication is very straightforward.  We consider a pair of users A and B, where A
wants to send B a confidential message and needs a session key to encrypt it.  We suppose that A and B
have associated TTPs TA and TB respectively, where TA and TB are distinct.  Since this scheme is
intended to provide warranted access to user communications via the TTPs, we assume that each TTP is
within the jurisdiction of an intercepting authority, and each TTP operates subject to the regulations of
that authority (such TTPs will probably operate within the terms of a licence).
2.1 Initial requirements
Before use of the mechanism, TA and TB need to agree certain parameters, and exchange some
information.
• TA and TB must agree between them values g and p.  These values may be different for each pair of
communicating TTPs, and must have the usual properties required for Diffie-Hellman key
exchange, namely that g must be a primitive element modulo p, where p is a large prime.  These
values must be passed to any clients of TA and TB who wish to communicate securely with a client
of the other TTP.
• TA and TB must agree on the use of a digital signature algorithm.  They must also each choose their
own signature key/verification key pair, and exchange verification keys in a reliable way.  Any user
B wishing to receive a message from a user A, with TTP TA, must be equipped with a trusted copy
of TA’s verification key (typically this would be provided by TB, perhaps using a signed
certificate).
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• TA and TB must agree a secret key K(TA,TB) and a Diffie-Hellman key generating function f.  This
function f shall take as input the shared secret key and the name of any user, and generate for that
user a private integer b satisfying 1 < b < p-1 (which will be a ‘private receive key’ assigned to that
user–see immediately below).  The secret key K(TA,TB) might be generated by a higher-level
Diffie-Hellman exchange between the TTPs, or by any other method.
Given that B is to be given the means to receive secure messages from A, before use of the mechanism
A and B must be provided with certain cryptographic parameters by their TTPs.
• Using the function f, the secret key K(TA,TB) and the name of B, both TA and TB generate the
private integer b satisfying 1 < b < p-1 (as described above).  This key is known as B’s private
receive key.  The corresponding public receive key for B is set equal to gb mod p.  The private
receive key b for B needs to be securely transferred from TB to B (like other transfers discussed
here, this can be performed ‘off-line’).  Note that B can derive its public receive key from b by
computing gb mod p.  Note also that this key can be used by B to receive secure messages from any
client of TA; however, a different key pair will need to be generated if secure messages need to be
received from clients of another TTP.
• A must be equipped with a send key pair, for use when sending confidential messages to clients of
TB (in fact this key pair could be used with many other TTPs, as long as they share the values g and
p).  TA randomly generates a private send key for A, denoted a (where 1 < a < p-1 ).  A’s public
send key is then set to ga mod p.  TA then signs a copy of A’s public send key concatenated with the
name of A using its private signature key, yielding a certificate for A’s public send key.  The
certificate is passed to A with a copy of A’s private send key a (this must be done using a secure
channel between A and the TTP).
 In principle A could generate the private send key a him/herself, and then only pass its public send
key to TA (by some reliable means which does not need to preserve secrecy).  TA would then sign a
copy of A’s public send key concatenated with A’s name to yield a certificate for A’s public send
key, and then pass it back to A.  The key escrow system would still work even though A’s TTP
might not know A’s private send key.  However, as discussed below, the system works in a more
flexible way if A’s TTP does know A’s private send key, while giving TA A’s private send key does
not give TA access to any more encrypted messages than if TA did not have this key.
• A must also be given a copy of B’s public receive key.  B’s private receive key b can be computed
by TA using f, the name of B, and the key  K(TA,TB).  TA can then compute B’s public receive key
gb, which can then be transferred in a reliable way from TA to A.
2.2 The mechanism itself
As we have seen, before use of the mechanism, A has the following information:
• A’s own private send key a;
• a certificate for A’s own public send key (ga mod p), signed by TA;
• the public receive key (gb mod p) for user B, and;
• the parameters g and p.
This information can be used to generate a shared key gab mod p for encrypting a message to be sent
from A to B.  This key can be used as a session key, or better, as a key-encryption key (KEK).  The
KEK can be used to encrypt a suitable session key.  This latter approach has a number of advantages:
• it would facilitate the sending of email to multiple recipients, since the message can be encrypted
once under a random session key, and this session key can then be distributed to each recipient by
encrypting it using the KEK, and
• it allows the use of a new key for each message.
User A then sends the following information to user B:
• a message encrypted using the session key (either gab mod p or a key encrypted using gab mod p),
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• A’s public send key (ga mod p) signed by TA, and
• the public receive key (gb mod p) for user B
The received public receive key gb mod p allows B to find its corresponding private receive key b (there
will be a different receive key for each TTP with whose users B communicates).  B can then generate
the (secret) session key gab mod p by raising A’s public receive key (ga mod p) to the power of B’s own
private receive key b, and thus can decrypt the message.
A diagrammatic representation of the scheme is given in Figure 1.
 
TA TB
A B
B’s private receive keyA’s private send key
B’s public receive key
Encrypted message + A’s public send
key + B’s public receive key
 Figure 1:  Use of the TTP scheme for one-way encrypted communication
2.3 Warranted interception
If a warrant exists for legal interception of a message, an intercepting authority can retrieve either the
private send key of the ‘sending user’ or the private receive key of the ‘receiving user’ from the TTP in
its jurisdiction, and use this in conjunction with the public receive key of the ‘receiving user’ or the
public send key of the ‘sending user’, respectively, to recover the key for the encryption.  An
intercepting authority never has to deal with TTPs outside its jurisdiction, and no TTPs outside its
jurisdiction need know what is going on.
More specifically, suppose user A (served by TTP TA) has sent a message to B (served by TTP TB).
There are two cases to consider, depending on whether TA or TB is required to provide access to the
encrypted message.
First suppose TA has to provide access to the message.  There are two ways in which TA could recover
the shared key gab mod p.  It can combine either:
• B’s private receive key b (generated from K(TA,TB) and the name of B using the function f), with
• A’s public send key (ga mod p), sent with the message,
or
• A’s private send key a, with
• B’s public receive key (gb mod p), sent with the message.
Second suppose TB has to provide access to the message.  Because TB will not have access to A’s
private send key, there is only one way TB can get the shared key gab mod p, namely by combining
• B’s private receive key b (generated from K(TA,TB) and the name of B using the function f), and
• A’s public send key (ga mod p), sent with the message.
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When presented with appropriate authorisation (e.g. a warrant), there are two ways for the TTP to
provide access to communications.  The TTP could pass the appropriate keys to the intercepting
authority, and then take no further part in the process, or the TTP could use its escrowed key(s) to
decipher messages supplied by the intercepting authority, without revealing the keys themselves.
In order to assess the relative merits of these different approaches to providing warranted interception,
we need to consider four possible situations (where the first two appear to be the most likely scenarios).
We use notation from our discussion immediately above.
1. TA is warranted to provide access to all outgoing communications from a user A for which it acts.
2. TB is warranted to provide access to all incoming communications to a user B for which it acts,
3. TA is warranted to provide access to all incoming communications (from users for which it acts) to a
user B for which it does not act,
4. TB is warranted to provide access to all outgoing communications (to users for which it acts) from a
user A for which it does not act,
We first suppose that the TTP is required to provide keys to the intercepting authority.  In case (1) it is
sufficient for TA to provide the private send key(s) for A, and divulging these keys to the intercepting
authority will not reveal information about any traffic not being sent by the user covered by the warrant.
Note that, if TA did not possess the private send key for A, then it would be much more difficult for TA
to provide warranted access to all A’s messages (it would be necessary for TTP to supply the session
key for each individual recipient).  In case (2), TB can supply B’s private receive keys for each of the
other relevant TTPs; as before, divulging these keys to the intercepting authority will not reveal any
information about any traffic not being sent to B.  In case (3), TA can supply B’s private receive key
(which it can work out), again without revealing any information not covered by the warrant.  Case (4)
is the most problematic, since TB will not have access to A’s private send key.  In this case (which is
less likely than cases (1) or (2)), all TB can do is provide the intercepting authority with the key gab mod
p for every other user B which A sends messages to.  Thus in all but one, relatively unlikely, case, the
TTP can very easily provide exactly the key which will enable the intercepting authority to access the
identified user’s communications, without providing access to any communications which the
intercepting authority is not entitled to.
The second approach to providing warranted access, i.e. having the TTP decipher messages ‘on
demand’, avoids any of the problems we have just discussed.  However, the main disadvantage of this
approach is the increased communication required between the TTP and the intercepting authority, and
the potential delay in accessing enciphered information.
Ultimately, the exact way in which TTPs provide warranted access to communications is a political
matter, and may vary from domain to domain.  The purpose of the above discussion is to show what
options are available, and consider their relative merits.
2.4 Properties of the mechanism
We next observe a few significant properties of the proposed mechanism.
• First note that a user can change his/her send key pair at any time.  A user simply asks his/her TTP
to generate a new key pair, which is passed by the TTP to the user (with a signed certificate).
• No directories are needed to make the system work.  An entity sending a message needs only get
the public receive key for the recipient from his/her own TTP, who can generate this information
from the name of the recipient and knowledge of the recipient’s TTP.  A recipient of an enciphered
message will, with the information sent with the message, possess all data necessary to get the
session key, without further reference to any third parties.
• Although receive key pairs are apparently fixed, by including the year (or month and year) within
the scope of the key generating function f, receive key pairs can automatically be updated at regular
intervals.
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2.5 Possible methods of attack
We next briefly consider what approaches might be used to attack the scheme.  First observe that the
scheme is based on the Diffie-Hellman key exchange scheme, which has withstood detailed scrutiny
over a period of time.  The only means of attack on Diffie-Hellman of relevance here would appear to
be the Burmester attack, [6].  As discussed in [4], this attack is not a threat in practice.  In any case,
given that a TTP always checks that a user possesses the private key corresponding to their public key
before generating a certificate, which is already accepted practice for Certification Authorities, then the
Burmester attack does not apply.
3. A brief analysis
Clearly, the definition and agreement of a set of requirements acceptable across a broad set of countries
is largely a political process.  However, we can give a set of typical or likely requirements on which to
base an analysis of the suitability of the scheme.
Use of the scheme should provide visible benefits for the user.  The design and operation of the scheme
means that TTPs can offer their services to users on a commercial basis.  By signing up to a
licensed TTP, a user can communicate securely with every user of every TTP with whom his TTP
has an agreement.  The user can potentially choose from a number of TTPs in his home country,
thus increasing trust in the TTP.
The scheme should allow national and international operation.  The scheme achieves this by allowing
users in any country, where an appropriate TTP resides, to communicate securely.  It also ensures
that the intercepting authority can obtain the required keys from a TTP within its jurisdiction.
Details of the scheme should be public.  This has been achieved for the scheme by [3].
The scheme should be based on well known techniques, and Diffie-Hellman certainly qualifies.
All forms of electronic communication should be supported.  The scheme can easily be adapted to
cover two-way communication such as voice telephony.
The scheme should be compatible with laws and regulations on interception, as well as on the use,
export and sale of cryptographic mechanisms.  This matter is the subject of further study, but no
problems have yet been identified.
Access must be provided to the subject’s incoming and outgoing communication, where a warrant is
held.  This is clearly achieved for the scheme, as the subject’s TTP will be able to provide the
appropriate session keys.
The scheme should support a variety of encryption algorithms, in hardware and software.  As the
scheme deals solely with key management, any suitable encryption algorithm can be used, as long
as it is available to users of the scheme (wherever they reside) and to the relevant interception
authority.  This could be achieved by using a standard list of algorithms, e.g. the ISO register.
An entity with a warrant should not be able to fabricate false evidence.  This is particularly applicable
in countries where intercepted communications are admissible as evidence in court.  The scheme as
it stands does not meet this requirement, but the provision of digital signatures as an additional
service by the TTP will allow it to be met.
Where possible, users should be able to update keys according to their own internal policies.  The
scheme allows users to have new send key pairs as often as wished.  Receive keys, which are a
fixed function of the TTPs’ shared key and the user’s identity, are more permanent, and change
only if the TTPs’ shared key or the user’s identity changes.  However, as we have noted, if there is
a requirement for receive keys to change at regular intervals, a date stamp could be included in the
scope of the key generating function f.  This would have the advantage that any private receive key
provided to an intercepting authority would have a limited validity period, so that the warranted
interception capability would only last for a certain time before needing to be renewed.
Abuse by either side should be detectable by the other.  We believe that this is the case for this scheme,
although abuse by collusion between the two sides may still be possible.  The main disincentive to
such abuse may be the ‘shrink-wrapped’ provision of the software, which could be bundled in with,
say, an email system or other telecommunications software.
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Users should not have to communicate with TTPs other than their own.  The only communication
required is with a user’s own TTP.
On-line communication between TTPs should not be required.  The independent generation of the
receive keys means that no such communication is required.
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